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Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly*1




Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on 
collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels 
than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first 
investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we 
focus on collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game. We show that, 
regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always 
sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that 
cooperation has an upper bound determined by the most inefficient firm.
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Resumen
Usando el coeficiente de cooperación, analizamos el efecto de las asimetrías 
en costes en los acuerdos colusorios cuando las empresas son capaces de coor-
dinarse en niveles de producción distintos de aquel que maximiza el beneficio 
conjunto. En este contexto, primero investigamos en qué medida son factibles 
los acuerdos colusorios. En segundo lugar, nos centramos en la sostenibilidad 
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de la colusión en un juego repetido infinitos periodos. Se demuestra que, in-
dependientemente del grado de asimetría en costes, al menos cierto nivel de 
colusión siempre es sostenible. Finalmente, también se obtiene el grado de 
colusión endógeno para demostrar que la cooperación tiene un límite superior 
determinado por la empresa más ineficiente.
Palabras clave: Colusión, asimetrías en costes, sostenibilidad.
Clasificación JEL: L11, L13, L41, D43.
1. Introduction
A standard assumption in cartel formation and collusion sustainability 
has been that all firms are identical in terms of their costs, even if there was a 
degree of differentiation amongst their products or in firm’s timing decision. 
However, the assumption of cost symmetry is unrealistic and very restrictive 
when one looks to real markets. A primer approach to tackle cost asymmetries 
was inferred from an early paper by Patinkin (1947), where a cartel maximises 
total industry profits and therefore allocates output quotas so that the cartelised 
industry operates as if it was a multiplant monopolist allocating output between 
plants. Moreover, costs asymmetries are proved to play also an important role 
when firms attempt to reach collusion1. As Bain (1948) points out cost hetero-
geneity would mean that, in the absence of side payments between firms, such 
an allocation might not be viable as inefficient firms may obtain lower profits 
in the cartel than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The intuition is that firms 
may find it difficult to agree on a common collusive policy because firms with 
a lower marginal cost will insist in lower prices than those firms with higher 
marginal cost would wish to sustain. More generally, the common wisdom is 
that the diversity of cost structures may rule out any possible agreement in 
pricing policies and so exacerbate coordination problems. In addition, technical 
efficiency would require allocating higher production quotas to low-cost firms, 
but this would clearly be difficult to sustain in the absence of explicit agreements 
or side transfers. Thus, it seems natural to characterise a class of agreements 
different to the most collusive outcome (i.e., the monopoly solution), namely 
imperfect collusion2. Such an agreement allows firms to achieve some degree 
of collusion and also to sustain that agreement over time.
Admittedly, the possibility of collusive firms operating with different cost 
functions has also received some attention in the modern Industrial Organisation 
literature. For instance, Osborne and Pitchik (1983) in a static non-cooperative 
model where firms are capacity-constrained allow for side payments and show 
1 The literature on partial cartels with a dominant firm (namely, a cartel) facing a competitive 
fringe has also examined this issue. As an example, Donsimoni (1986) has shown that in 
this framework a degree of cost heterogeneity can be accommodated.
2 This concept is different to partial collusion which refers to a market where only a subset 
of firms colludes. See for instance Verboven (1997), Escrihuela-Villar (2008) or Mendi 
et al. (2011).
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that the profit per unit of capacity of the small firm is higher than that of the 
large one. Schmalensee (1987) in a static game with linear costs in a Cournot 
setting characterises the set of profit vectors by applying a number of selection 
criteria such as the Nash bargaining solution. He finds that if a leading firm’s 
cost advantage is substantial, its potential gains from collusion are relatively 
small. By their very nature, however, in a static model cartel members do not 
cheat on a cartel agreement since it is assumed that agreements are sustained 
through binding contracts. This may, therefore, be viewed as a model of explicit 
or binding collusion. These papers thus do not impose the incentive compatibility 
constraints of subgame perfection and the collusive outcome derived in their 
models may not be self-enforced. Looking at Friedman’s (1971) supergame-
theoretic approach to collusion a few papers have also considered the problem 
of enforcement of collusive behaviour with asymmetric firms. Rothschild (1999) 
shows that the stability of the cartel may depend crucially upon the relative 
efficiencies of the firms and that joint profit maximisation becomes less likely 
as cost functions differ across firms. Vasconcelos (2005) in a quantity setting 
oligopoly model assumes asymmetry by modelling that firms have different 
shares of a specific asset and shows that the sustainability of perfect collusion 
crucially depends on the most inefficient firm in the agreement, which represents 
the main obstacle to the enforcement of collusion. More recently, Miklós-Thal 
(2011) shows that in a Bertrand supergame some collusion is also sustainable 
under cost asymmetry whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry 
and Contreras et al. (2008) have shown that with differentiated products a cartel 
may also be stable provided that returns to scale are high enough. Summarising, 
both the literature on static cartel stability and the dynamic models of tacit 
collusion suggest that collusion is unlikely to be observed in the presence of 
substantial competitive advantage, and therefore, a prior step before studying 
collusion sustainability when costs are heterogeneous and firms agree on output 
quotas is to consider whether collusion is viable. In line with these results, the 
analysis of the empirical literature also indicates that cost asymmetries hinder 
collusion (see for instance Levenstein and Suslow, 2006)3.
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which imperfect collusion can be 
a way to sustain a collusive agreement in the presence of large cost asymme-
tries when firms produce a homogeneous product. First, we study whether cost 
heterogeneity is sufficient to make it impossible for firms to collude (and its 
sustainability over an infinite horizon) when coordination is not necessarily on the 
allocation that maximises total industry profits. In this sense, in their empirical 
studies Eckbo (1976) and Griffin (1989) provide an interesting motivation with 
this respect by finding that even though cartels that are made up of similar-sized 
firms are more able to raise prices, in some cases high-cost members of a cartel 
may produce at a cost larger than 50% above low-cost members4. Consequently, 
the question about why and to what extent should cost asymmetries be a re-
3 Experimental works provide equivalent results. For instance, Mason, Phillips and Nowell 
(1992) show that in an experimental duopoly game cooperation is also more likely when 
players face symmetric production costs.
4 In this line, Wirl (2015) empirically analyses OPEC behavior in a Cournot setting. It is 
assumed that OPEC adjustments affect country members in a different way depending 
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straint for collusion naturally arises. Secondly, we also study how the degree 
of collusion can be endogenously determined. Such degree of collusion may be 
interpreted as part of an explicit cartel agreement (and allocating thus different 
output quotas depending on the firm’s relative efficiency) or it can be thought 
of as a degree of coordination when collusion is tacit.
Once the degree of collusion is characterised we investigate the sustain-
ability of imperfect collusive agreements in a multi-period duopoly model. We 
use subgame perfect Nash equilibria –henceforth, SPNE– as solution concept. 
It is well known that this repeated game setting exhibits multiple equilibria. To 
select among those equilibria we adopt the particular criterion of restricting 
strategies to grim trigger strategies where firms adhere to the collusive agreement 
until there is a defection, in which case they revert forever to the static Cournot 
equilibrium. The key feature is the assumption that firms maximise the sum-
mation of its own profits plus a proportion of the profits of the other firms. As 
a consequence, this proportion may be considered as the degree of coordination 
under an (imperfect) collusive agreement. This approach has received growing 
attention of scholars (see for instance Symeonidis, 2008 or Matsumura et al., 
2013), it is also closely related to the coefficient of cooperation defined by Cyert 
and DeGroot (1973), and captures the relative performance approach that is 
evolutionary stable (Vega-Redondo, 1997). These objective functions are also in 
line with the growing and more recent behavioural economics literature, as well 
as with experimental games that test the extent to which subjects are concerned 
with reciprocity (see for instance Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Charness and 
Rabin, 2002 respectively).
Our main contribution is to show that in a quantity-setting model some 
degree of imperfect collusion can always be sustained regardless of the cost 
heterogeneity. The intuition is that even though cost asymmetry hinders collu-
sion, for each possible level of their discount factor firms can always coordinate 
on an output level below the competitive one. Hence, one can expect collusion 
between firms to occur, at least to some extent, also with very asymmetric firms 
since these firms may still have an incentive to adhere to an imperfectly collu-
sive agreement. Consequently, the antitrust authorities should also be cautious 
when firms in an industry have significantly different cost functions because 
firms’ willingness to collude may be still present. It is also obtained that the 
endogenous degree of collusion to be sustained has an upper bound that can 
never be overcome. This boundary is determined by the most inefficient firm and 
depends negatively on the degree of cost asymmetry. In other words, although 
some degree of coordination (generally) might lead to higher profits overall, at 
the same time the aforementioned adjustments in the degree of collusion seem 
to be limited by the willingness of the most inefficient firms. Therefore, in a 
market with significant production cost asymmetries, a negative relationship 
on its production capacity. His results suggest that the OPEC does not behave as a perfect 
cartel in the sense that country members should reduce outputs below its current level.
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between firms’ efficiency and the endogenous choice of the degree of sustain-
able collusion can be expected5.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the model 
is presented. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyse imperfect collusion and its sus-
tainability. In Section 5 the degree of collusion is made endogenous. Section 6 
presents some extensions of the model showing, for instance, that the effect of 
cost asymmetries on firms’ collusion incentives is also robust to other ways to 
parameterise the product-market competition. Section 7 concludes. All proofs 
are grouped together in the Appendix.
2. Set Up of The Model
We consider an industry with two asymmetric firms indexed by i = 1,2 where 
each firm simultaneously produces a homogeneous product. Even though quantity 
competition is assumed, it is well-known from Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) 
that in a two-stage oligopoly game where, first, there is simultaneous production, 
and, second, after production levels are made public, there is price competition, 
the unique equilibrium outcome is the Cournot outcome. Consequently, the pres-
ent model could also be interpreted as a market in which firstly capacities are 
determined and secondly price competition takes place. Regarding production 
costs, we assume a technology such that firms produce with a quadratic cost 
function  where qi is the output produced by firm i. The func-
tion ρi (c) accounts for the asymmetry between firms, taking values 1 + c and 
1 – c, respectively, with 0 < c < 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
firm 1 is the inefficient and firm 2 is the efficient one6. Hence, as c approaches 
the unity firms become more asymmetric. Differences in the slope of marginal 
costs can be interpreted for instance as resulting from differences in capital 
stocks7. Some features of the cost functions should be emphasised at the outset. 
Firstly, following the reasoning provided by Rothschild (1999) and in order for 
the collusive outcome not to become trivial, the cost functions are not linear. If 
on the contrary, firms had different but constant marginal costs, it would clearly 
be practical for the firm with the lowest costs to produce the entire output. In the 
present model though, a switch of production exclusively to the most efficient 
firm would raise industry costs. The second feature is that fixed costs are taken 
5 Our model presents also a similarity with partial ownership arrangements. Even though 
cross-ownership also takes into account rivals’ profits in the static Cournot game, in our 
model, the above-mentioned reciprocity only implies cooperation among firms if collusion 
is sustainable whereas firms’ reciprocal concern disappears in a competitive environment. 
In this sense, our approach differs from that in the tradition of Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
where the owners of each firm may write a contract in the first stage in which its managers 
are remunerated according to their performance compared to their competitors.
6 The results of the present paper also carry over to an oligopoly model with n efficient and 
n inefficient firms. We present the duopoly model for ease of exposition since comparative 
statics with respect to n just confirms the intuitions provided in the comprehensive surveys 
and the basic game-theoretical results on collusion exploring which factors facilitate or 
hinder collusion. Details from this extension are available from the authors upon request.
7 In Section 6 this idea is extended to discuss the effect of capacity constraints in the model.
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to be zero. This simplifying assumption is common in the literature, partly for 
simplicity but also because provided that fixed costs are not so high as to force 
firms out of the market, the relative magnitudes of the payoffs to firms from 
different actions are unaffected by the omission of a fixed cost.
The industry inverse demand is given by the piecewise linear function 
p(Q) = max(0,1 – Q), where p is the output price and  is the industry 
output. In the absence of coordination, each firm plays a Cournot stage game. 
The profit function for firm i is given by:
(1)  
We characterise imperfect collusion in the Cournot-stage game consider-
ing a particular model where each firm maximises the sum of its own profit 
and a fraction of the profit of the other firm. Explicitly, each firm i maximises 
 where . We assume a to be constant and 
symmetric in such a way that, regardless of whether a firm is efficient or inef-
ficient their degrees of reciprocal concern with the rival coincide. The parameter 
a thus can be interpreted as representing the degree of collusion8. Admittedly, 
although we build a direct link between a and the degree of collusion, the reader 
might feel more comfortable when such link is made explicit and based on a 
direct behavioural assumption like the output produced. Arguably, we could 
also interpret our model as one in which firms’ strategy set is a quantity in the 
interval between the joint-profit maximising allocation and the asymmetric 
Cournot equilibrium where a merely parameterises the most collusive output 
achievable as a result of the efficiency differences between firms.
Definition 1: Collusion is said to be imperfect if . On the contrary, 
collusion is said to be perfect if a = 1.
An alternative consideration is that since we assume away side-payments, 
one could think that firms should bargain over possible outputs9. Our approach 
is somewhat different. We assume that firms coordinate to behave as in a model 
of symmetric cross-ownership but according to their different efficiency level, 
even though in the present model firms behave as Cournot competitors when they 
do not collude. In other words, we consider a profit-sharing rule where firms’ 
profits are to some extent proportional to capital stocks. Bos and Harrington 
(2010) and the references cited therein provide abundant motivation about this 
rule often referred to as a proportional rule.
8 We note that Escrihuela-Villar (2015) shows that using conjectural variations and the 
coefficient of cooperation leads to equivalent closed-form solutions.
9 In this line, Schmalensee (1987) uses an axiomatic bargaining model to show that low-
cost firms may have little to gain from collusion.
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3. Characterisation of an Imperfect Collusive Agreement
Let  denote the quantity corresponding to the collusive output. Given a 
degree of asymmetry c, we obtain the following collusive equilibrium quantities 
and profits for firm i,
(2)   
where throughout the paper and abusing notation, we assume as exogenously 
given c. It is straightforward to obtain the Nash-Cournot non-cooperative equi-
librium and the associated level of profits for each firm in (2) for a = 0. We 
denote them by , and  respectively.
We note that  since if a increases firms’ production tends 
to the one of a perfectly collusive market where outputs are reduced in order 
to increase the price. However,  decreases (increases) with c for firm 1 
(firm 2) since collusion requires an efficient reallocation of outputs concentrating 
production in the more efficient firm. Consequently, when c increases over a 
certain critical value, an inefficient firm may not be interested in being part of a 
perfectly collusive agreement because profits attained under such an agreement 
are lower than those obtained at the Cournot stage game. Intuitively, if collu-
sion is perfect, in order to maximise joint profits the reduction needed in the 
quantity produced by the inefficient firm compared to the Cournot equilibrium 
is not compensated by the price increase. This argument also applies if a is 
large enough but lower than 1. However, if a is low enough imperfect collusion 
can still allow the inefficient firm to obtain larger profits than without collusion 
for any level of efficiency differences. On the contrary, it is straightforward to 
check that  for any . Since collusion implies that the cartel 
minimises the total costs of producing a given output level, allocating thus pro-
duction amongst the firms in such a way that marginal costs are equalised, the 
efficient firm always benefits from collusion. In fact, this implies that a firm’s 
share in the output of the cartel, and the profits which it obtains are larger if 
the firm is relatively more efficient10. The following lemma proves that at least 
some collusion is always feasible with an upper bound negatively associated 
with the cost asymmetry11.
10 We note that this is only one of several possible bases for allocating cartel output but 
it has the advantage of being simple to implement and intuitively derived from a cost 
minimization process. See Schmalensee (1987) for different plausible alternatives.
11 We note thus that with increasing marginal costs and imperfect collusion the less efficient 
firm has still positive production levels. This is in line with the results of Schmalensee 
(1987) with bargaining and a linear cost function.
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Lemma 1: For any  there always exists  such that  
if , where  decreases with c. Conversely,  if .
4. Sustainability of Imperfect Collusion
We assume in this section that firms compete repeatedly over an infinite 
horizon with complete information (i.e. both firms observe the whole history of 
actions) and discount the future according to a common discount factor 
At any stage the profit function is given by (1). Time is discrete and dates are 
denoted by t = 1, 2,... In this framework, a pure strategy for firm i is an infinite 
sequence of functions  with  where  is the set of 
all possible histories of actions (output choices) of each firm up to t – 1, with 
typical element , and Q is the set of output choices 
available to each firm. We follow Friedman (1971) restricting our attention to 
the case where each firm is only allowed to follow grim trigger strategies such 
that firms adhere to a collusive agreement until there is a defection, in which 
case they revert forever to the static Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Hence,  
can be specified as follows. At t = 1, , while at t = 2,3,...
(3)  
Although there is a multiplicity of equilibria since the above strategies sus-
tain different collusive outputs, we focus on an equilibrium that depends on a 
and hence on the efficiency differences between firms12. Thus, firms producing 
 in each period can be sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game with the 
strategy profile (3) if and only if the following conditions are satisfied
(4)  
where  denotes the profits obtained by firm i in an optimal deviation 
from the collusive output . In other words, if d exceeds a certain critical 
level the inequalities described in (4) are satisfied. We denote by  this 
critical value of the discount factor where  is a SPNE of the repeated game 
if . In order to characterise , we need to define 
12 Note that we do not use a as a device to select among the multiple equilibria of a collusive 
dynamic game. As mentioned above, a is merely a parameter that characterizes and justifies 
the extent of imperfect collusion.
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 which is obtained by replacing  in  where 
 Therefore,  
where
 
As we prove in the proof of Proposition 1 the condition on d in (4) is always 
more easily satisfied for the efficient firm than for the inefficient one (namely, 
)13. Therefore, we can define collusion sustainability as follows:
Definition 2: Imperfect collusion is sustainable if .
The following proposition shows that (some) imperfect collusion is always 
sustainable regardless of the cost asymmetry of firms.
Proposition 1: For any  there always exists  such that no 
matter how small d is, collusion on an output level below the competitive one is 
sustainable if  with . Furthermore,  increases with a and c.
In other words, a is an upper bound on the degree of collusion that can be 
sustained in the infinitely repeated game. The above proposition thus extends 
Lemma 1 in the sense that collusion sustainability is only possible if firms agree 
on a lower degree of collusion14. The intuition is fairly simple. From Rothschild 
(1999) we know that if in our model , perfect collusion becomes harder to 
sustain if firms’ cost asymmetry increases in such a way that if c is large enough, 
perfect collusion is not sustainable15. However, if we allow firms to sustain 
less collusion, the agreement may be sustained. Consequently, there is always 
a small enough degree of collusion that can be sustained despite the difference 
between firms’ costs. A numerical example may help clarify our result. For in-
stance, perfect collusion with c > 0.202 yields to . Consequently, the 
standard joint profit maximisation allocation cannot be sustained. However, when 
13 We note that Rothschild (1999) obtained the equivalent result for a = 1.
14 We also note that, since (4) can also be written as  
and  is always true regardless the value of a, the upper bound on a such that 
coincides with the one obtained in Lemma 1 needed in order for  
to be satisfied. 
15 Additionally, Harrington (1991) uses the Nash bargaining solution concept to obtain that, 
in general, the larger the cost differences the higher the discount factor needed to sustain 
tacit collusion. More recently Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) reach similar conclusions 
when firms compete in supply functions.
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we consider imperfect collusion,  can be sustained if  (since 
). Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 show that if a is small enough, 
the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma scheme of a quantity-setting collusive market 
is restored since  where (some) imperfect collusion 
is always sustainable. This result can also be interpreted in the following way. 
One can check that for a given value of d and when a = 0,
1) The incentive constraint described in (4) is binding for the inefficient firm: 
2)  when a increases from zero.
Hence, there always exists an incentive to assume at least some coordination 
between firms because, in a Cournot market, collusion profits increase with 
the degree of collusion more than what deviation profits do. In fact, for a given 
 the left hand side of the inequality , 
which is obtained from (4), has an inverse U-shape function relationship with 
respect to a. Figure 1 shows this insight for  and c = 0.25 
where  In these cases, the maximum level of 
imperfect collusion that can be sustained as a SPNE of the infinitely repeated 
game is respectively .
FIGURE 1
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5. Endogenous Imperfect Collusion
In this section, a is made endogenous by adding an initial stage in which 
firms choose the extent of imperfect collusion. We assume that firms firstly and 
simultaneously choose a degree of collusion, namely ai, to afterwards continue 
with the infinitely repeated game described above. We characterise the problem 
that firms solve in the first stage denoting the profits that firms obtain in the 
initial stage by  for i and j = 1, 2 and i ≠ j where firm i maximises
(5)  
and where  is analogous to the collusive profit function defined in (2) 
but for the case of asymmetric a. Firm i chooses ai anticipating that both firms 
will only maximise their (imperfectly) collusive profits whenever the degree of 
collusion chosen by firms is sustainable. Otherwise, firms’ profits correspond 
with the non-cooperative Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In other words, once firms 
decide about ai and aj, and according to (3), imperfect collusion may be sustained 
as a SPNE of the repeated game only if . On 
the contrary, if  imperfect collusion cannot be 
sustained. Consequently, the solution to (5) gives rise to two different reaction 
functions ai(aj) for i and j = 1, 2 and i ≠ j for each possible value of d. Therefore, 
the intersection of these reaction functions leads us to a solution with different 
values for the endogenous degree of collusion for firms. We note that even 
though firms might deviate from the output agreed, we implicitly assume that 
firms cannot deviate from the degree of collusion decided in the first stage as 
long as ai and aj are non-cooperatively decided in the first stage
16.
We assume for simplicity though that firms agree on a common value (such 
that ) that we denote by a* and that we can interpret as an upper 
16 We believe that several reasons justify this assumption. Firstly, assuming cooperation on 
the initial degree of collusion is a considerably more complex model as long as possible 
deviations on ai and aj in every period should also be considered markedly extending the 
set of strategies available to firms. Secondly, in a non-cooperative game where the type 
of collusion considered is merely tacit one could also think that the extent of collusion 
to be sustained should be decided also non-cooperatively. Relaxing this assumption has 
been left for future research.
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bound on the degree of collusion to be sustained17. In order to obtain a*, we 
firstly analyse how the functions defined in (2) change with a18.
Lemma 2: The function  defined in (2) always increases with a in the 
interval . Conversely,  increases with a up to  where 
it reaches a maximum value.
The most efficient firm always prefers more collusion whereas for the inef-
ficient firm, if  the rule for output allocation in order to (imperfectly) 
collude implies that its production is highly reduced and its profits are smaller 
than when . On the contrary, if  inefficient firm’s profits increases 
with a and, therefore, this firm would rather choose the highest possible (namely, 
sustainable) value of a over the interval . Consequently, a potential mutual 
agreement on a to which both firms adhere may be obtained since it follows 
directly from Lemma 2 that the inefficient firm’s decision on a is binding in 
order to sustain collusion.
Proposition 2: Let’s consider the function . Then, if  the 
endogenous degree of collusion is such that . On the contrary, for a 
given , the endogenous degree of collusion a* is the a that solves 
the equation 
Proposition 2 states that the endogenous degree of collusion is the one that 
maximises inefficient firm’s profits whenever firms are patient enough to sustain 
it as a SPNE of the repeated game. In this case, the efficient firm would rather 
sustain perfect collusion. However, for the inefficient firm among all the possible 
sustainable degrees of collusion,  is the one where its profits are maximised. 
Therefore,  is the endogenous degree of collusion. Otherwise, that is if  is 
not sustainable, the endogenous degree of collusion is the largest sustainable 
one by the inefficient firm for a given d. In other words, since collusion can only 
be sustained if both firms agree, the inefficient firm is the one that imposes her 
will. For each possible level of the discount factor, the inefficient firm is always 
willing to sustain a lower degree of collusion than the efficient firm, either 
17 When we allow for different levels of imperfect collusion, results do not qualitatively 
change. We obtain that both firms have incentives to choose the minimal possible degree 
of cooperation to the extent that collusion does not collapse turning profits to the ones 
of the Cournot allocation. Roughly speaking, free riding incentives are alleviated by the 
fact that if a firm does not cooperate enough with the rival, collusion collapses and both 
firms are worse off. Further details are available at https://goo.gl/V87MbS or from the 
authors upon request.
18 We note that since  and  increases with a then a* might always be 
sustainable if  Moreover, we assume also that both firms correctly anticipate that 
 for all a.
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 if firms are patient enough or  otherwise. Therefore, even though 
imperfect collusion will always arise in equilibrium, the degree of collusion is 
limited by the degree of cost asymmetry between both firms. It is also natural 
to analyse thus how a* varies with d and c.
Proposition 3: The endogenous degree of collusion decreases with c. Also, if 
, the endogenous degree of collusion increases with d.
Intuitively, as the cost asymmetry increases, the inefficient firm is less will-
ing to cooperate since collusion would imply a larger switch of production to 
the most efficient firm. Turning back to the numerical example provided above, 
we can better illustrate the results of the present section. Assume for instance 
c = 0.202. Then, the degree of collusion that maximises profits of the inefficient 
firm is  (note that if c = 0, obviously ). Therefore, if for example 
d = 3, since ,  cannot be sustained. As a conse-
quence, one can obtain (Proposition 2) the endogenous degree of collusion by 
solving the equation . The solution is a = 0.32 which, in this case, 
is the endogenous symmetric degree of collusion.
6. Extensions
Although some fundamental issues have been raised in the present paper, 
some potentially important questions still need to be addressed. In this Section, 
we present an alternative approach to managing the degree of cooperation, the 
presence of capacity constraints, and finally, we discuss the case in which firms 
make their strategic choices sequentially.
Considering other business practices that may possibly have anticompeti-
tive effects and enable firms to coordinate price increases provide also a rich 
area for future research. For instance, Holt and Scheffman (1987) provide some 
interesting examples like the use of best-price policies or the public advance 
notification of list-price increases. In the same line, García-Díaz, González and 
Kujal (2009) show that, in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model, the 
use of list pricing might be a possible collusion facilitating device.
6.1. Discount factor and the degree of cooperation
We test here whether Proposition 1 hinges on the assumption made in Section 2 
regarding the way to measure the intensity of competition. In particular, we 
assume here that the degree of cooperation is captured by the discount factor. 
We consider an industry like the one described in our benchmark model but 
for the case where a = 1. We assume also that firms play an infinitely repeated 
game at dates t = 1,...,∞ with a common discount factor  and restrict-
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ing attention to the well-known grim trigger strategies. Each firm producing a 
collusive output corresponds to a SPNE if and only if the following condition 
is satisfied for each firm:
(6)  
where  denotes the one period profit from deviation and  the profits 
obtained by each firm at the perfect collusive equilibrium. There are many 
SPNE collusive output vectors that satisfy the system of inequalities in condi-
tion (6) above. As in Verboven (1997) and Escrihuela-Villar (2008), we select 
an equilibrium from this large set assuming that if d exceeds a certain critical 
level, the set of SPNE vectors is not a binding constraint, and the distribution 
of output is the symmetric distribution of the output under perfect collusion. 
We also note that this critical level is the  previously defined evalua-
ted at a = 1. Then, a perfectly collusive outcome is a SPNE of the repeated 
game if  where, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, 
 is satisfied. On the contrary, if d is below that critical level, then 
the set of SPNE vectors is a binding constraint, and the distribution of output 
is the solution to the equality constraint in (6). Unfortunately, the underlying 
system of equations cannot be further simplified. However, Rothschild (1999) 
proved that with quadratic cost functions the incentive to deviate is increasing 
in the deviant’s inefficiency and that, therefore, collusion is feasible whenever 
the most inefficient firm adheres to the agreement. Consequently, we make the 
simplifying assumption that we can just focus on firm 1. Let us denote by q2 
the collusive output produced by firm 2. Then, it can be easily checked that the 
quantity produced by firm 1 in the collusive equilibrium also depends on d. We 
denote it by  and it is given by
(7) 
Notice that when d = 0 the Cournot outcome holds, whereas  
the perfectly collusive equilibrium is reached. Hence, as d varies from zero to 
 the degree of collusion increases. As the collusive profits of firm 1, that 
we denote by , depend on d it can be proved that for all  
the following is true.
Proposition 4: If c is small enough , and  increa-
ses with d. Conversely, if c is large enough  is only true if d 
is low enough.
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The intuition is as follows. In a collusive equilibrium, firms are willing to 
cut production compared to the non-collusive equilibrium. This output reduction 
favours the inefficient firm as long as this firm is not “too inefficient”. Therefore, 
the firm is not punished to further cut its production in order to maximise joint 
profits. On the contrary, if firm 1 is markedly inefficient compared to firm 2, 
further joint profit maximisation might imply a detrimental output contraction 
of firm 1. Hence, Proposition 4 shows that Proposition 1 also carries over to the 
case where d captures the degree of collusion.
6.2. Capacity constraints
Capacity constraints also play a key role in the analysis of tacit collusion. 
In our model demand is constant, so capacity constraints unambiguously affect 
collusion and its sustainability19. It is well known that the level of firm’s capital 
stock determines the maximum level of production capacity, i.e. the capacity 
constraint. Capacity constraints affect collusion sustainability in at least two ways: 
they reduce the incentives to deviate as well as the severity of retaliation. Many 
studies on this issue have focused on symmetric situations where all firms have 
the same capacity (see for instance Abreu, 1986). It seems plausible to think, 
however, that in a model with cost asymmetries, firms’ production capacities are 
also asymmetric. Let us assume that firms may bear a common maximum level 
of cost , which is already determined by the access to capital market. Notice 
that there is no reason to assume that firms have different conditions to access 
the capital market. However, differences in efficiency may come from labour 
organisation and other internal production issues. In our model, this is captured 
by the parameter c, which in turn determines . Hence, we assume that a 
given level of , thus , it determines a maximum capacity level . Therefore, 
for any level of production q, it is hold . As q increases 
both firms approach  at a different path because marginal costs are higher 
for the inefficient firm. As a result, for a given level  it can be determined a 
maximum level of capacity ,
  ,
where . Thus, our model can be also interpreted as one where maximum 
capacity is determined by the level of c. Some studies suggest that the introduction 
of asymmetric capacities makes indeed collusion more difficult to sustain when 
the aggregate capacity is limited (see for instance Davidson and Deneckere, 1990 
or Compte, Jenny and Rey, 2002). The intuition is that punishing a firm with a 
low capacity puts an upper bound on the punishment that the other firms may 
19 In fact, when either demand is subject to cyclical fluctuations (see for instance Fabra 
2006), or it exists demand uncertainty (see for instance Staiger and Wolak 1992), the 
effect of capacity constraints in collusion and its sustainability need a deep analysis that 
go beyond our study.
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inflict. Hence the other firms have to suffer the punishment they impose on the 
low capacity firm. Consequently, a firm with a large capacity might be reluctant 
to participate in such a punishment. In our model, this effect is relaxed by a. 
Indeed, the larger the difference in capacity, the lower a is needed to imperfectly 
collude. Thus, in the case of retaliation, the punishment is less severe. Hence, 
it seems that the introduction of asymmetric capacity constraints in our model 
would work in the same direction as cost asymmetries hurting also collusion 
sustainability. Presumably, then, a reduction in the degree of collusion could 
alleviate the effect of capacity constraints on collusion sustainability.
6.3. Simultaneous vs. sequential strategic choice
As Mouraviev and Rey (2011) show in a fairly general framework, such 
leadership is not effective in case of quantity competition since, following an 
aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, 
making it more difficult to punish the deviation20. They also show that quantity 
leadership along the equilibrium path does not allow the firms to achieve a Pareto 
improvement. The intuition is that since quantities are strategic substitutes and 
firms should lower their outputs to increase their profits, if the leader reduces 
its output then the follower should increase its own quantity in order to sustain 
collusion. In fact, this can also be empirically observed. In their interesting 
survey of EC cartel decisions, Mouraviev and Rey show that while (production 
or distribution) capacity appears as the key strategic variable in some cases, 
leadership does not feature in any of these observations.
7. Concluding Comments
We have developed a theoretical framework to study how firms’ cost asym-
metry affects the possibility that a collusive agreement can be sustained over 
time. Contrary to the usual assumption made in many oligopoly models, we 
introduced that an imperfectly (tacit) collusive agreement can be sustained in the 
event that firms also care about the other firms’ profits but just to some extent. 
Our main contribution is twofold. We show that even though cost asymmetry 
hinders collusion, imperfect collusion can always be sustained regardless of 
the cost asymmetry. Secondly, we also analyse the endogenous degree of col-
lusion by assuming that firms agree on a common degree of cooperation. We 
show that there is a limit to the degree of sustainable collusion that depends on 
the most inefficient firm of the industry. Another interpretation of our results is 
also that cost asymmetry is not necessarily a restraint for collusion as long as 
firms are able to sustain the maximum degree of collusion contingent on their 
discount factor. In this sense, some evidence suggesting collusive agreements 
among firms of significantly different costs of production represents an empiri-
cal justification for our findings.
20 Conversely, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) show that when firms have capacity 
constraints, the outcome under price leadership is more collusive than the outcome under 
simultaneous price-setting.
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The framework we have worked with is only a particular approach to a more 
general issue. To analyse real-world cartels, additional research is required, and 
for instance, a wider range of demand functions should also be considered. It 
would also be interesting to test if our results are robust to using an optimal 
punishment like the “stick-and-carrot strategies” proposed by Abreu (1986, 
1988). We believe that those are subjects for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: From (2) when i = 1 and a = 0, Cournot profits are at 
. Let us denote by  the 
function that captures the difference between collusive and Cournot profits. 
Obviously, it can be verified that f (c, 0) = 0.
Then,  only 
if c is large enough; it implies that the most inefficient firm is only worse off in 
the perfectly collusive agreement compared to the Cournot equilibrium if this 
firm is relatively inefficient enough compared to the efficient ones. Therefore, 
since  does not depend on a and  increases with a when a is small 
enough (see the proof of Lemma 2), there exists  small enough such that if 
, which yields . It implies that the inefficient firm obtains larger 
collusive profits than in the Cournot equilibrium. Since the upper bound on a 
such that  coincides with the one needed in order for  to 
be true, then whenever  increases with c, a decreases with c. Details have 
been omitted from the paper to save space, but are available in an additional 
Appendix21. ¨
Proof of Proposition 1: Since  
 if  and  The condition under which 
the first inequality holds is proved in Lemma 1, so in order to prove Proposition 
1 it suffices to check that
 
We also prove that collusion is more easily sustained for the most efficient 
firm:  for all . Although the expressions for these cutoffs 
cannot be easily simplified to be included in the paper, they can still be obtained 
from the values of the profit functions evaluated under Cournot competition, 
21 We used the program Wolfram Mathematica 7.0. Further details for this and subsequent 
proofs are available at https://goo.gl/K4muLu or from the authors upon request.
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imperfect collusion and an eventual deviation from it. They are reported in the 
main text for i = 1, 2. Obviously, both cutoffs coincide in the symmetric case 
c = 0. Then,  Since  and  also depends on 
c, we can denote them by  It can be easily checked using a mathemati-
cal software that the equation  has no real root for  
then, it is enough to check that for a given c, the inequality to be proved holds. 
We know from Lemma 1 that when c is large enough  and therefore 
 It suffices to check that in this case  This 
is true as long as
  
and  The last inequality holds since  and Lemma 2 
proves that  while  does not depend on a. Regarding the 
second part of the proposition, it is enough to show that
  
i.e; the cutoff of the discount factor increases with a when a is very small. 
Then, an increase in a always increases  Indeed, with mathematical 
software, we can check that the equation  has no real root 
for  in other words, that the cutoff changes (increases) monotonically 
with a. Regarding the effect of c, we apply the same procedure. First,
  
and the equation  has no real root for  ¨
Proof of Lemma 2: Let’s consider the firms’ collusive profits that we denoted 
by  and  It can be easily proved with the software Mathematica® 
that there is no real root for the equation  if  which im-
plies that profits of the efficient firm change monotonically with a. Then, since 
profits for the efficient firm when a = 1 are larger than those when  
 the result holds. 
Besides, regarding the inefficient firm,  has only one root in a and 
as long as profits increase with a for small enough a:
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Inefficient firm’s profits necessarily decreases with a when a is larger than 
the root mentioned before. ¨
Proof of Proposition 2: Let’s define  as the minimum value of 
the discount factor such that  can be sustained as a SPNE of the repeated 
game. We need thus to analyse to different cases. On one hand,  It is 
obvious from Lemma 2 that in this case inefficient firm’s best response to any 
a2 is always  if  because both a smaller and a larger degree of 
collusion than  is profit-dominated by  as long as  is sustainable. On the 
other hand,  cannot be a Nash equilibrium since  is domi-
nated by  (the efficient firm could push to sustain more collusion) 
and  is also dominated by  (the inefficient firm could 
still increase its collusive effort). Therefore, the only possible Nash equilibrium 
in the first case  is thus  and  Regarding the second case 
where  let’s denote by   the maximum degree of collusion that can be 
sustained as SPNE for each possible  namely  is the solution to the 
equation  for a. We note that we implicitly assume that firms may 
correctly anticipate that  increases with a. The actions  
and  do not constitute a Nash equilibrium. This is true since in both 
cases firms would obtain the non-collusive equilibrium profits  as long as 
collusion would not be sustainable while each firm could optimally deviate by 
choosing  where . Moreover,  and  do not 
constitute an equilibrium either since inefficient and efficient firms can optimally 
deviate by choosing  respectively. Analogously,  and 
 do not constitute an equilibrium either since  and  
represent profit enhancing unilateral deviations, respectively. Finally, we need to 
check that there is no optimal deviation from  Any lower a would 
decrease firms’ profits (Lemma 2) and any unilateral deviation on a by one firm 
increasing a would not affect firm’s profits. As a consequence,  for 
 and  constitute a Nash equilibrium. ¨
Proof of Proposition 3: For the first part of the result, we have to check that 
 As  does not depend on d we can obtain  like the argmax 
. Although the solution cannot be explicitly obtained, the equation 
 can be solved for c giving
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Then,  Hence, one can easily check that  
Using Lagrange’s notation, the derivative of the inverse function is given by 
 and thus it is also decreasing its inverse func-
tion. Regarding the second part of the proposition, from the proof of Lemma 1 
and Proposition 2 we know that  and  
Finally, the result follows directly because the endogenous degree of collusion 
is obtained  ¨
Proof of Proposition 4: From (7) profits for firm 1 can be easily obtained,
Non-cooperative  Nash  equilibrium  profits  are  given  by 
 Then, we simply have to check that for all 
 if  then  
and  Conversely, if  we can 
easily check that  while  since, by definition, 
d = 0 corresponds to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium when  
Then, since  by continuity, there exist  such that 
 ¨
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